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Abstract
The structure of election administration is a crucial component of the democratic project of any state. In Nigeria, it is widely
acknowledged that the structural character of the country’s election management body –the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC) has over the years become the focal points at which elections are compromised. With insights from
interviews and focused group discussion; conducted amongst INEC commissioners, staff and representatives of political
parties within the period: 2009-2011, this paper is a graphic analysis of how the structure of INEC complicates the election
administration process and democratic sustainability in Nigeria.
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Introduction
The structure of election administration is a crucial component of the democratic
project of any state. Whether elections are conducted by an independent body, a ministry of
government or by a mixed election administration system, the election management body
(EMB) must be perceived as being neutral for the stabilization of a democratic regime.
Indeed, this reality is at the centre of liberal democratic theory. However, the election
administration system in many new democracies has generated a lot of controversy - arising
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from the level of independence of EMB’s, their professionalism and the acceptability of the
elections they conduct.
In Nigeria, the election administration process since independence has always resulted
in controversy and crisis arising mostly in part from the perceived collaboration of EMB’s
with the respective ruling military or civilian regimes. The implication as noted by Ajayi is
that the history of electoral administration in Nigeria has been a “history of controversy
engendered by electoral malpractices” (2007:142). It is in realization of the controversial and
problematic nature of election administration in Nigeria; that an Electoral Reform Committee
(ERC) was set up in 2007 to: “examine the entire electoral process with a view to ensuring
that we raise the quality and standard of our general elections and thereby deepen our
democracy” (The report of the Electoral Reform Committee- ERC: 2008).
While Nigeria’s EMB – the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
plays a central role in the democratic project of Nigeria, it is widely acknowledged that the
structural character of INEC has over the years become the focal points at which elections are
compromised (ERC, 2008: 20). With insights from interviews and focused group discussion;
conducted amongst INEC commissioners, staff and representatives of political parties within
the period: 2009-2011, this paper is a graphic analysis of how the structure of INEC
complicates the election administration process and democratic sustainability in Nigeria.
1. A general overview of the structure of election administration and EMB’s
Structurally, EMB’s are classified according to different criteria; and they are
differently placed in different state systems. They are said to follow a “governmental
approach” when elections are run by regular civil servants; a “judicial approach” when judges
are selected to administer elections; a “multi party approach” when party representatives
compose the electoral body or an “expert approach” when political parties designate by
consensus a group of experienced individuals renowned for their independence (Garber 1994;
Harris, 1997). A more comprehensive three fold classification of EMB’s has been formulated
on the basis of structural characteristics that combine recruitment methods with functions
performed: permanent; independent national electoral commissions, the centralized electoral
system or the government ministry (Klein 1995).
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In addition, the institutional shape of EMB’s varies with a country’s political and
cultural traditions and its experience of democratic development (Pinto, 2000: 20). Table 1.1
presents a threefold categorization of the structure of EMB’s across the globe.
Table 1.1: A global categorization of the structure of election administration
Source: Pintor .R.L (2000), Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance, Bureau For
Development Policy, United Nations Development Programme. Pp25
As can be seen in table 1.1, while some patterns notably elections run by the
executive branch alone remained tied to history, the more general trend worldwide,
particularly in the new democracies of Latin America, Asia, East and Central Europe and
Africa is movement towards an independent electoral commission. Thus, most EMB’s are
enshrined in constitutions as mechanisms to limit sudden change by executive action or
ordinary legislative process. This is the case in some Latin American countries like Costa
Rica and Venezuela; where the constitution establishes the electoral authority as a fourth
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branch of government with the status of the executive, legislature and the judiciary. While
many of the newly democratizing states of Africa have given their EMB’s constitutional
status, very few of the EMB’s in Africa have actually been established as the “fourth arm of
government”. The Nigerian case as shall be seen in the course of this paper is illustrative.
Figure 1.1 A  graphical illustration of EMB’s as the fourth institution of government
(The independent model)
Source: Moveh. D. O (2012), Election Administration and Sustainable Democracy:
A Study of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (1999-2011),
Unpublished, PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science,
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria
Figure 1.2 A graphical illustration of election administration as an agency of the
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Source: Moveh. D. O (2012), Election Administration and Sustainable Democracy:
A Study of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (1999-2011),
Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science,
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
Figure 1.3: A graphical illustration of a mixed model of election administration
Source: Moveh. D. O (2012), Election Administration and Sustainable Democracy:
A Study of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (1999-2011),
Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science,
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
1.3 The structure and function of inec
The structure of Nigeria’s election administration system is embodied in the INEC.
INEC was established by Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution of the federal republic of
Nigeria as a corporate body with perpetual succession and may sue and be sued in its
corporate name. According to part one (1) of the third schedule of the 1999 constitution of
Nigeria, sub section 15, INEC has the power to:
a. Organize, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and
Vice President, the Governor and Deputy Governor of a state and to the
membership of the Senate, the House of Representatives and the House of
Assembly of each state of the federation.
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b. Register political parties in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and
act of the National Assembly.
c. Monitor the organization and operation of the political parties, including their
finances.
d. Arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and account of
political parties and publish a report on such examination and audit for public
information.
e. Arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to note and prepare,
maintain and revise the register of voters for the purpose of any election under the
constitution.
f. Monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern
the political parties.
g. Ensure that all electoral commissioners, electoral and returning officers take the
oath of office prescribed by law.
h. Delegate any of its powers to any resident electoral commissioners
i. Carryout such other functions as may be conferred upon it by an act of the
National Assembly (1999 Constitution of Nigeria).
In addition to the functions assigned by the 1999 Constitution, the INEC establishment
acts of 1998 gives the commission the power to:
a. Conduct voter and civic education
b. Promote knowledge of sound democratic electoral processes; and
c. Conduct any referendum required to be conducted pursuant to the provision of the
1999 constitution or any other law or act of the National Assembly.
Sections 197 – 205 of the Constitution also provide for the establishment of State
Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) for each state of the federation. INEC has its
Headquarters in Abuja, with offices in the capital cities of the thirty-six (36) States, including
the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) as well as in the 774 Local Government Areas in the
country.
According to section 14, Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution, INEC
shall comprise the following members:- A Chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive
officer; and - Twelve other members to be known as National Electoral Commissioners.
Section 14 also stipulates that the Chairman and the National Electoral Commissioner shall
be persons of unquestionable integrity; and shall not be less than 50 years and 40 years old
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respectively. The Constitution also provides for the appointment of a Resident Electoral
Commissioner for each State of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja.
At the apex of the organizational structure of INEC is the Chairman who serves as the
Chief Executive Officer of the Commission; who together with the 12 National Electoral
Commissioners constitutes the policy-making organ. Until the introduction of the 2006
electoral act, the Nigerian President had the power to appoint someone from the ranks of
Federal Permanent Secretaries to serve as the Secretary to the Commission. Such an
individual is also usually the Accounting Officer and Head of the Secretariat. The
Commission, at the National Headquarters, functions through Departments and Directorates
as shown in figure. 1.4. In June 2005 a key institution within INEC-The Electoral Institute
(TEI) was established for the purpose of the following objectives:
1. Facilitate capacity building and professionalism in the commission through training
and manpower development of the commission’s staff.
2. Engage in vigorous voter education activities with a view to achieving an increased
and effective participation of the electorate in the electoral process.
3. Carry out electoral research and documentation (Igbani 2006: 56).
Figure: 1.4 An organizational structure of inec headquaters
Source: Research and Statistics Department INEC Headquarters, 2011
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Since its establishment, INEC has conducted four general elections in Nigeria. These are the
general elections of 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011.
1.4 Structural dependence of inec and the administration of elections in Nigeria
There are two crucial areas in the structure of INEC which compromises its
independence; with implications for the electoral administrative process and the sustainability
of democracy in Nigeria. These are: the method of constituting the electoral management
team (commissioners) and the funding of INEC.
1.4.1 The constitution of the electoral management team (commissioners)
There are two methods of determining the profile of members of electoral
commissions. The first option involves appointing only members who are not partisan or
politically inclined, while the second option involves the appointment of people on the basis
of their political affiliation. In essence, the neutrality expected of the electoral commission
may take two forms:
I. Either a deliberate consideration of the political dimension; with the risk of partiality
which is expected to be averted through a balanced representation of political forces; or
II. An exclusion, in principle of any political consideration, which is manifested not only
in the exclusion of political parties in the selection of the members of the commission, but
also in the demand for non-partisan affiliation of members to be appointed into the
commission (Hounkpe and Fall, 2011:11). This has supposedly, been the case in the
constitution of members of INEC.
In the appointment of electoral commissioners Section 154 (1) of the 1999
constitution of Nigeria empowers the President to appoint the chairman and commissioners of
INEC subject to the confirmation by the senate. Although this provision was not operational
in the 1999 elections, the provision as gathered from interviews of political party officials and
the transition monitoring group (TMG - a coalition of over 50 civil society organizations and
human rights groups involved in election observation in Nigeria)  ensured that former
President Olusegun Obasanjo appointed members of his political party -the PDP as
commissioners; who served in the electoral commission during the conduct of the 2003, 2007
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and even to the 2011 Presidential elections. The TMG in particular; maintained that most of
the national commissioners and particularly, the resident electoral commissioners (REC’s)
were nominated by PDP governors from their respective states. Indeed, this problem is
compounded by section 156 (1) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria which states that no
person shall be qualified to be a member of INEC if he is not qualified or if he is disqualified
for election as a member of the house of representatives.
Figure 1.5: A graphical illustration of Nigeria`s election administration system
Source: Moveh. D. O (2012), Election Administration and Sustainable Democracy:
A Study of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (1999-2011),
Unpublished, PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science,
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
As can be seen in Figure 1.5 Nigeria’s election administration system does not
conform to the independent model (as in figure 1.1), the governmental model (as in figure
1.2) or the mixed model (as in figure 1.3). In fact, there is either, an apparent confusion as to
which model of election administration to operate in Nigeria or a deliberate complication of
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the structure of the election administration system in the country. While INEC is presented
and labeled as an “independent body” it has in reality been constituted as an extension of the
executive (figure 1.5 is indicative). The personal observation of the researcher corroborates
this fact. For example it was observed in all the INEC offices visited across Nigeria that the
official vehicles of INEC; including the Toyota land cruiser jeeps of the commissioners were
tagged “Presidency”. Thus, to what extent can INEC be independent when even its logistics
is tied to the executive? Furthermore, it will be noticed in figure 1.5 that there are other
institutions controlled directly by the executive which play important roles in the electoral
administration process. The police for example provide security; while the ministry of
information and the national orientation agency play important roles particularly in the area
of voter education. Civil society organizations also play important roles in the area of voter
education in Nigerians election administration process. However, more worrisome is the role
played by political parties (through state governors and local government chairmen) in the
electoral administration process. Political parties in Nigeria are not members of the
management team of INEC; yet, apart from being subordinated to the electoral administration
process, political parties and candidates also play a part in the administration of elections in
Nigeria. Information gathered from focused group discussions amongst INEC permanent
staff indicated that political parties and candidates provided part of the logistics for the
administration of elections; with a view to influencing the outcome of the process in their
favour. For example in the voter registration exercise of 2002 an 2006 generators for
powering the computers used for registration and accommodation for electoral officers was
provided by parties through the state governors and local government chairmen. When asked
if the commission (INEC), had not made any arrangements for the logistics of the elections
the respondents noted that except for the activities leading to the 2011 general election, in the
1999, 2003 and 2007 elections, the commission told electoral officers to liaise with their
governors and local government chairman for logistics! This reality is corroborated by the
chairman of INEC who noted with regards to the logistics of the 2011 general elections:
…we met a budget on ground and you are aware that
the 2010 appropriations were reduced. That budget cut also
affected us because while we were requesting for 74 billion
Naira for the direct data capture machines and other logistics
our capital budget was reduced by 8 billion. That money was
meant to address some of the infrastructural decay in our state
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and local government offices which are in a state of
disrepair…we will be making a representation to the
government on this so that we will reduce to the barest
minimum the dependence of our staff on governors and local
government chairmen for some logistics because we found out
that some of them (INEC Staff) make themselves available to
be used by going to the governors and local government
chairmen to request one favour or the other (Daily trust 31st
August, 2010).
While the foregoing statement by the INEC chair in the run up to the 2011 elections
suggest attempts towards reducing the dependence of INEC on the state and local
governments for logistics, it also accentuates another structural problem of the commission-
funding.
1.4.2 The funding of INEC
Electoral finance, seen as the cost that a country incurs as a result of the various
activities undertaken by an EMB and other agencies in the conduct of an electoral process has
been the object of controversy in many emerging democracies including Nigeria. Indeed,
while the funding of elections in Nigeria appear to be costly, the controversy surrounding
electoral finance arises more from who finances the EMB and how, than from the actual cost
of conducting the elections. This notwithstanding, a categorization of electoral finance for the
three main models of EMB’s can be made.
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and IFES cost of
registration and elections (CORE) project, electoral finance may be divided into three
categories namely:
a. Core cost (or indirect cost): This refers to those costs that are routinely associated
with implementing an electoral process in a stable electoral environment.
b. Difusse cost (or indirect cost): This refers to those cost for electoral related services
that cannot be disentangled from the general budget of agencies that assist with the
implementation of an electoral process; and
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c. Integrity cost: This refers to those cost over and above the core costs that are
necessary to provide safety, integrity, political neutrality and a level playing field for
an electoral process. Integrity costs are often largely sponsored by the donor
community; and may not be included in EMB budgets, even though they cover
functions within the EMB’s mandate (international IDEA, 2008).
According to the CORE project of IFES, core costs are proportionally highest in
stable democracies (or what may be referred to in the context of this research as sustained
democracies); as progress towards democratic sustainability tends to lead to a decrease in
integrity cost and an increase in core costs. Furthermore, the CORE project of IFES further
suggests that diffuse cost tend to be higher in stable (sustained) democracies; especially in
Western Europe and North America, where electoral processes are more likely to be
implemented by governmental EMBs under the governmental or mixed model of election
administration. EMBs under the independent model are however more likely to have sole
responsibility for electoral functions; and thus higher levels of readily identifiable direct cost
and a lower level of diffuse cost than EMBs under the governmental or mixed model; Figure
4.8 is indicative.
Figure 1.6: Electorak finance in different EMB
Models
Source: Moveh. D. O (20121), Election Administration and Sustainable Democracy:
A Study of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (1999-2011),
Unpublished, PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science,
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Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
In line with figure 1.6, INEC alone bears the core costs of election administration in
Nigeria. According to section 3 (1) of the 2006 electoral act; there is to be established for the
commission a fund to be known as the independent national electoral commission fund.
Section 3(2) of the electoral act 2006 identifies other sources of the commissions funds to
include: monies allocated by the Federal Government of Nigeria to enable it exercise its
constitutional functions, monies accruing to it by way of interests from investments made on
the fund, and aids and grants made by development partners to facilitate its ability to carry
out its functions. Furthermore, the commission subject to section 5 of the 2006 electoral act is
to be funded under six budgetary heads, namely:
1. Consolidated revenue fund charges (including personal emoluments of
national commissioners and resident electoral commissioners).
2. Cost comprising salaries and allowances of staff of the commission.
3. Overheads comprising office running costs, travels and transportation, the
maintenance of equipment, utilities, bank charges etc.
4. Special electoral capital comprising the cost of balloting instruments (i.e.
ballot papers, result sheet, ballot boxes etc).
5. Special electoral capital (including ad-hoc staff training cost, allowances of
ad-hoc registration and poll officials, etc) and other structural capital
(comprising the construction of buildings, purchase and installation of
equipments like generators etc)
6. Purchase of vehicles etc (Ibrahim 2010: 35)
Over the years, two key issues relating to the funding of INEC have generated
controversy. These are:  the approval of election expenditure and the method of disbursement
of approved funds on a timely basis. As can be seen in the foregoing six budgetary categories
of INEC; while the salaries and allowances of commissioners are charged directly on the
consolidated revenue reserves, election expenses in Nigeria are not. This creates serious
problems for the election administration process in Nigeria; as INEC has to join the queue at
the ministry of finance for its funds. Indeed, given the huge capital outlay required for INECs
activities, the performance of its responsibilities has largely been dependent on the
government which makes decisions about funding. While for many independent EMBs,
funding is a separate line item in the national budget; released directly to the EMB by the
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treasury, this is not the case in the Nigerian situation. As a result, the disbursement of funds
to INEC has not always been timely. For example, in the run up to the 2003 elections, INEC
cried out three times for funds enable it carry out its statutory responsibilities (LEMT 2003).
The delay in the release of the funds affected the commissions operations to the extent that it
severely constrained  the over half a million  ad-hoc staff of various categories (polling
assistants, polling clerks, presiding officers, supervisory presiding officers, collation officers
and returning officers) recruited to run the over 120,000 polling stations and collation centers
in the country (Ibrahim, 2010:35-36). As was gathered from focused group discussions with
INEC staff; it also manifested in the delay in embarking on voter registration, the holding of
stake holders’ dialogues and procurement and acquisition processes. In the run up to the 2007
elections the situation was not different. The late preparation and training of ad-hoc staff and
the delay in the distribution of INEC guidelines on the elections to local and foreign
observers also resulted from the delay in the release of funds to the commission. Similarly, in
the run up to the 2011 general elections the chairman of INEC raised alarm about the
negative implications the delay in the release of funds will have for the electoral process. In
fact, in the case of the 2011 general elections an observer noted:
The legislative exercise of reviewing and approving a
budget for INEC was a sad display of an inherent lack of
professionalism, transparency and commitment to the
fundamental elements of democracy and governance. Despite
adequate knowledge of the need to address INECs budgetary
crisis, both houses of the legislature opted to remain on holiday.
INEC chair had informed the legislature that he would need 74
billion naira by 11th August to have any chance of conducting
credible elections. The distinguished members of the senate did
not convene until 10th August in what was referred to as an
emergency session…such a lackadaisical attitude to the duty to
promptly and adequately address the issue of funding INEC
undermines the capacity of INEC and posses a direct challenge
to democracy in Nigeria (Okoye, 2011).
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1.5 Summary and conclusion
The structural challenge of Nigeria’s election administration system has to do with the
manner of appointment of commissioners of INEC and the funding of the commission.
Indeed, INEC does not conveniently fit into any of the three main models of EMB’s (that is
the independent, governmental or mixed model). While INEC is being described and
presented as an independent body, it has in reality been constituted as an extension of the
executive. The implication of this fact is that the incumbent regime occupys a position where
it could undermine the election administration process to its advantage. Establishing the
structural independence of INEC; particularly in the area of appointment of commissioners
and funding is therefore a basic requirement for guaranteeing the credibility of the election
administration process and the sustainability of democracy.
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Appendix 1: List of interviewees and nature of interview schedule
1. Dr. Samson F. Awujoola, Head of Operations, INEC Delta state office, recorded
interview conducted on the 6th October 2010.
2. Mr. A. Junaid, Head of Operations, INEC Ondo state office, recorded interview
conducted on the 8th October, 2010.
3. Engr. Rotimi Fashakin, National Publicity Secretary, CPC, recorded interview
conducted on the 6th December 2011
4. Mal. Lawal Shuaibu, National Secretary, ACN, Recorded Interview conducted on the
8th December 2011.
5. Hon Lawan Shettima Ali Secretary General ANPP. Interviewed (Recorded) through
Mal. Abdullahi Yusuf Gashua, Director of Special Duties and Special Adviser to the
National Secretary, ANPP on the 6th December 2011.
6. Alhaji Shittu Adegbola, Administrative Secretary, INEC Ekiti state office, recorded
interview conducted on the 8th October, 2010.
7. Mr. Festus Okoye, former National Coordinator Transition Monitoring Group.
Recorded interview conducted on the 9th December, 2011.
8. Mr. Ezuma Sunny N. INEC Headquarters (the electoral institute), unrecorded
interview/ informal interactions.
9. Mal. Adamu Umar, INEC Zamfara state office, unrecorded interview/informal
interactions.
10. Mr. Gbenga Otun, INEC Kogi state office, unrecorded interview/ informal
interactions.
* The questions raised in the course of the interview probed the general experiences of
respondents in the election administration process.
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Appendix 2: Participants and theme of the focused group decision
The focused group discussions held in the September 2010 and June 2011.
Participants include: 39 members of staff of INEC; drawn from INEC offices across Nigeria.
The participants happened to be on a course on election administration at the researcher’s
institution at the time of this study.
The general theme of the focused group discussion was “Election Administration in
Nigeria 1999-2011”. Participants were encouraged to share their experiences in the general
elections conducted by INEC from 1999-2011.
